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Plea Bargaining: Is Contract Law or Constitutional Law
the Governing Principle?
Plea bargaining is now a recognized and important feature of the
criminal justice system.' Although the plea bargaining process is an
integral part of the administration of justice, there are inherent
problems that require judicial safeguards. In Cooper v. United States,2
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was con-
fronted with the problem of the unkept plea bargain and its effect on
the fundamental rights of the defendant. The court, in refusing to use
analogies from the law of contracts, held that the plea bargaining proc-
ess is governed by principles of constitutional law. Constitutional fair-
ness requires that the Government honor the bargain.
The defendant, while acting as an informer for the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, in a conversation with one Simpson against
whom he was to be a witness, offered for $10,000 to remove himself as a
witness against Simpson and flee to Mexico. As a result of this and
subsequent conversations, Cooper was indicted on two counts of brib-
ery of a witness and two counts of obstruction of justice.3 On May 11,
1977 at around 11:00 a.m., an Assistant United States Attorney and
Cooper's defense counsel met to discuss a possible plea bargain.' After
some initial negotiations, an agreement was reached that provided inter
alia, if Cooper pleaded guilty to one count of obstruction of justice and
testified in on-going narcotics trials, the Government would inform the
sentencing judge of his cooperation and dismiss all other counts in the
indictment.' The defense counsel agreed to communicate the proposal
to the defendant for his assent.
Defense counsel immediately visited Cooper and obtained his ap-
proval to the agreement. Beginning at approximately noon on May 11,
defense counsel attempted to call the Assistant United States Attorney
and notify him of Cooper's acceptance. Meanwhile, the Assistant
United States Attorney was meeting with his superior who instructed
him to withdraw the proposal. When the Assistant United States At-
torney and defense counsel finally made contact between 2:30 and 3:30
p.m. that same afternoon, Cooper's attorney was notified at the outset
1. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63
(1977); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
2. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 15.
5. Id.
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that the offer was withdrawn.6 Defense counsel protested the with-
drawal of the agreement to both the Assistant United States Attorney
and his superior, but to no avail. Defendant then moved to compel
enforcement of the proposal, and at a pre-trial hearing the motion was
denied by the district court. Thereafter, Cooper was convicted on all
four counts of the indictment and sentenced to fifteen years imprison-
ment.7
Writing for the court, Judge Phillips, in acknowledging that the
courts have drawn heavily on analogies from substantive and remedial
contract law in regulating plea bargaining,8 found that within classical
contract doctrines the defendant here could claim no right nor a result-
ing remedy because there was no enforceable agreement. The defend-
ant's attempted acceptance was preceded by the Government's
withdrawal of the offer. The court also found the alternative argument
of promissory estoppel to be of no avail because of the lack of "tangi-
ble" reliance by the defendant.
While recognizing that no relief can be given under contract law, the
court nonetheless finds that a right and violation of that right have been
shown and that relief must be given.' In emphasizing that it is not
questioning the utility of contract law to plea disputes, the court states
that the constitutional right of fairness is wider in scope and thus en-
compasses the defendant's right violated by the Government. Further-
more, constitutional decisions cannot be made to turn in favor of the
Goverment on the fortuities of communications or on a refusal by the
Government to accord any substantive value to reasonably induced ex-
pectations that it will honor its firmly advanced proposals. The court
specifically finds two distinct sources for the constitutional rights in-
volved: the right to fundamental fairness embraced within the substan-
tive due process guarantees and the right to effective counsel.'
The term "plea bargaining" suggests a give-and-take process
whereby a plea is negotiated. Generally the accused will plead guilty
as charged or guilty to a lesser included offense in return for a promise
of leniency or a promise to drop other pending charges." Beginning in
1927 with the landmark case of Kercheval v. United States,' 2 the
Supreme Court began the process of articulating a standard for the ac-
ceptance of guilty pleas. Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for the Court,
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 15-16.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Note, Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements, 51 N.C.L. REv. 602 (1973). For a
brief discussion of the origin and the various types of plea bargain arrangements see J. BOND,
PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS §§ 1.07-.09 (1978).
12. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
2
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stated that a guilty plea is not' valid unless it is voluntary and tendered
with a full understanding of the consequences. 3 Following Kercheval,
the Court later held that a guilty plea induced by promises or threats,
which deprive it of its voluntary character, is void. 4 In Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 5 the Court held that it cannot assume that a guilty plea was
voluntary from a silent record. The fact that the defendant voluntarily
and intelligently entered a plea of guilty must be spread across the face
of the record.' 6
In Brady v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court recognized the legiti-
macy of plea bargaining, holding that the fifth amendment does not
prohibit prosecutors from extending a benefit to the defendant in ex-
change for a guilty plea. To be sure, the Court acknowledged and gave
its imprimatur to the plea bargaining process in Santobello v. New
York,'Swhere Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, empha-
sized that plea bargaining is an integral and highly desirable part of the
criminal justice system.'9
However important plea bargaining is in the criminal justice system,
pleading guilty to a criminal offense is a serious matter. A guilty plea
automatically results in a conviction. "More is not required; the court
has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence."2 A guilty plea
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental right to trial by jury,21 to con-
front one's accusers, 22 to present witnesses in one's defense,23 to remain
silent, 24 and to be convicted based on evidence that establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 1t is primarily for these reasons that the
courts will give relief from an unkept plea bargain.
The courts have employed three somewhat overlapping theories in
granting relief to the defendant when the prosecutor has failed to fulfill
13. Id. at 223.
14. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). Petitioner alleged that the Govern-
ment threatened to prosecute him on two additional counts of bank robbery if he told anyone of
the alleged promise. Contra Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), where the defendant
refused to accept the plea arrangement and pleaded not guilty. Prosecution carried out its threat
to seek indictment under the habitual offender act. In upholding the prosecutor's use of available
leverage in the bargaining process, the Court stated: "[Aicceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea
bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a consti-
tutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process." Id. at 363.
15. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
16. Id. at 242.
17. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
18. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
19. Id. at 261.
20. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
22. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
23. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3
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his end of the bargain: (1) voluntariness; (2) fair play; and (3) due
process.26
The voluntariness theory originally was developed because the
courts ignored the bargained basis for a guilty plea and reviewed its
validity by the same standard used for the non-negotiated guilty plea.27
The theory is ill-suited for safeguarding the plea bargaining process
because, technically, any guilty plea induced by promises of the prose-
cutor is void.2 ' The courts have reasoned circuitously that if the guilty
plea was entered as a result of plea bargaining and the bargain is not
kept, the plea is deprived of its voluntariness.29
The second theory for remedying unkept plea bargain agreements is
the "fair play" theory. Relief is granted on an unkept plea bargain if
the negotiations are not conducted fairly by the prosecution and the
defendant is prejudiced. In United States v. Carter,3" the defendant
pleaded guilty to possession of stolen checks in exchange for a promise
by the Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
that he would not be prosecuted anywhere else for anything having to
do with the stolen checks.3' In violation of the agreement the defend-
ant was subsequently prosecuted in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia for possession of stolen checks. In en-
forcing the promise against a federal district not a party to the agree-
ment, the court held that the honor of the government and public
confidence in the fair administration of justice were at stake.32
The third theory for remedying unkept plea bargains requires that
the accused be afforded due process of law. If the accused pleaded
guilty because of prosecutorial misrepresentations, then it is said that
the defendant was deprived of liberty without due process of law.3 3
The courts have been reluctant to invoke this powerful constitutional
directive to secure relief from unkept plea bargains, although there are
a few decisions that have relied on due process.34 Such a constitutional
26. Note, Enforcing Unfulllable Plea Bargaining Promises, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 842
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Unfu/fllable Plea Bargaining].
27. J. BOND, supra note 11, at § 7.18.
28. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. at 493 (1962).
29. See e.g., Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973) (fulfillment of the plea
bargain is a necessary predicate to a conclusion of voluntariness); Harris v. Superintendent, 518
F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1975) (failure to make sentencing recommendation renders guilty plea invol-
untary); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957). (guilty plea entered without full
understanding of the consequences was not voluntarily entered).
30. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
31. Id. at 427.
32. Id. at 428.
33. Unfulfllable Plea Bargaining, supra note 26, at 845.
34. See e.g., Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (if the accused is deprived of due proc-
ess); United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960) (guilty plea induced by prosecutorial
promises not intended to be kept deprives the accused of due process); Dillon v. United Staes, 307
4
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rule was advocated by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in
San/obello v. New York. 35 Justice Douglas urged where the plea bar-
gain is not kept, that any sentence entered in reliance thereof should be
vacated and the trial court should determine whether in the interest of
due process the bargain should be specifically enforced or allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea and plead anew to the original
charges.
3 6
The criminal justice system is continually confronted with claims of
ineffective counsel by dissatisfied clients. This problem bears a special
significance to plea bargaining because of the extraordinary trust the
defendant has in his attorney to negotiate the most advantageous
agreement. In appraising claims of ineffective counsel, the courts have
been confronted with the dilemma of protecting the attorney "from
frivolous. . . claims and the need to extract bonafide cases of ineffec-
tive counsel from the multitude of accusations." '37 Traditionally, the
courts have framed the standard of ineffective counsel in terms of "a
mockery of justice,"38 "so inept as to reduce the representation to a
farce,"39 "shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court,"4 or "a
deliberate abdication of an attorney's ethical duty to his client."'" In
effect, to sustain a claim of ineffective counsel, the derelictions on the
part of counsel must have been of an extremely serious nature.42
In addressing the problem of effective counsel during plea bargain-
ing, the court in People v. Gilbert4 3 required that in order for a claim of
ineffective counsel to be sustained, it must appear that counsel une-
quivocably represented to the defendant that a plea bargain had been
accepted and that the defendant justifiably relied on the representation,
when in fact no such bargain had been accepted. In McMann v. Rich-
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (a plea induced by a promise not intended to be kept deprives the accused
of due process).
35. 404 U.S. at 266 (1971).
36. Id.
37. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining: What is the Standard?, 12 DUQ.
L. REV. 321 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Effective Assistance].
38. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied; 417 U.S. 948
(1974); Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Long, 419 F.2d 91
(5th Cir. 1969); Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966).
39. See, e.g., Stidham v. Wingo, 482 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Roche, 443
F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1971); Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966); Bouchard v. United
States, 344 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1965).
40. See, e.g., Hanks v. United States, 420 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 913
(1970); Borchert v. United States, 405 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1968); Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d
853 (5th Cir. 1967); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967).
41. See, e.g., Kelton v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Brown v. Swenson,
487 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 944 (1974); Peterson v. Missouri, 355 F. Supp.
1371 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Redus v. Swenson, 339 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mo.), aft'd, 468 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1972); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1971).
42. Effective Assistance, supra note 37, at 323.
43. 25 Cal. 2d. 422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944).
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ardson," the Supreme Court directed itself to the inquiry as to what
level of competency is required of counsel in plea negotiations. Justice
White, speaking for the majority, remarked:
In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent
advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that coun-
sel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession.
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when
motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence
depends as an initial matter not on whether a court would retrospec-
tively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether
that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.45 (Emphasis added).
This "range of competency" standard enunciated in McMann, ap-
peared to relax the stringent "mockery of justice" standard. Hence, the
defendant could more readily question the effectiveness of counsel in
negotiating and accepting a plea agreement.
The "range of competency" test of McMann has been frequently
evoked by the courts together with the older, more stringent "mockery
of justice" standard. The result has been that the courts have refused to
sever the "range of competency" test from the old standard, reducing it
to "virtually a redundant equivalent. '46 Thus, the standard of effective
counsel is intentionally stringent and ambiguous in order to protect the
attorney from the multitude of complaints from disappointed clients.
In deciding to foresake the beguiling precision offered by analogies
drawn from the substantive and remedial contract law, the court in
Cooper47 adopted a constitutional rule for regulating plea bargaining.
The court was able to arrive at its constitutional rule by employing
both the due process and fair play theories for granting relief from un-
kept plea bargains.
The court found the basis for its decision in the fifth and sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution. The fifth amendment
provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against him-
self, nor shall he be deprived of liberty without due process of law.48
This amendment is apposite because the defendant who pleads guilty,
whether it be the result of a negotiated or non-negotiated plea, waives
his right against self-incrimination. By pleading guilty the defendant is
the sole witness against himself; his guilty plea is the sole basis for his
conviction; nothing more is required but for the court to give judgment
44. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
45. Id. at 771-72.
46. "The 'range of competency' test has thus been de-emphasized primarily due to the court's
desire to give the attorney as much tactical leverage as possible." Effective Assistance, supra note
37, at 330.
47. 594 F.2d at 12.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6
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and sentence.4 9 To allow the prosecutor to induce the defendant to
plead guilty and then renege on the promise would be violative of
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of our civil and political institutions. 50
Inherent in the principles of fundamental liberty and justice is the
right of the accused to be treated fairly by the prosecution in negotiat-
ing and fulfilling the plea bargain. Although fair play is an essential
and uncompromising element of due process,5' the courts, in declaring
that the defendant must be treated fairly throughout the bargaining
process, have not characterized it as such.
5 2
Implicit in the Cooper decision is an awareness by the court that the
principle of "fair play" is a necessary concomitant of due process.
There is a fundamental obligation on the Government to negotiate and
treat the defendant with scrupulous fairness. Thus, the defendant who
pleads guilty as a result of a plea bargain is not treated fairly and has
been substantially prejudiced by waiving his right against self-incrimi-
nation when the prosecution reneges on the bargain.
The right to effective counsel derived its initial validity from the text
of the sixth amendment, which provides, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense."53 Subsequent to the Supreme Court's declaration in
Powell v. Alabama54 that the accused was entitled to the effective assist-
ance of counsel, the courts have been struggling to assay what consti-
tutes effective counsel. 5 The ruling in Cooper appears to relax the
standard for determining whether the defendant had effective counsel.
The confidence a defendant has in his counsel is jeopardized when
counsel has communicated a bargain to the defendant and the bargain
is withdrawn. Although this is a subtle point, it nonetheless may
amount to ineffective counsel. The reason is that since all communica-
tions regarding a plea bargain should be mediated to the defendant
through his counsel,56 the credibility of not only the Government, but
more importantly, defense counsel is involved in the defendant's per-
ception of the process. 7
In many, if not all jurisdictions, the courts have been reluctant to
ease the prophylactic rule developed in other areas concerning attorney
49. See 274 U.S. at 223.
50. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
51. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
52. See, e.g., Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 257; United States v. Carter 454 F.2d 426
(4th Cir. 1972).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. 287 U.S. 45(1932).
55. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
56. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I l(e)(1).
57. 594 F.2d at 18.
7
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conduct when considering plea bargaining related claims of ineffective
counsel. The majority of courts prefer to adhere to the traditional stan-
dards of "gross ineptness" or "mockery of justice."58 The standard ar-
ticulated by the court in Cooper is perhaps a subtle attempt at further
developing these standards and appears better suited for measuring ef-
fective counsel claims arising out of the plea bargaining process. The
standard presupposes that a very high degree of trust and confidence
will be placed by the defendant in counsel's ability to make the most
advantageous agreement. When the prosecution makes a firm offer to
the defendant which is accepted through his counsel and then with-
draws the offer for reasons such as a superior disagreeing with the
subordinate's judgment in making the offer, then the defendant's confi-
dence that his counsel pursued the most advantageous course is lost.
This subtlety is further illuminated by the instant case where the de-
fendant replaced counsel involved in the plea negotiations before trial,
indicating a lack of confidence.59
After finding that there was a right and a violation of that right, the
court was confronted with deciding upon a remedy for the defendant.
Chief Justice Burger, in Santobello v. New York, 60 noted that there are
two alternative forms of relief available to a defendant in the broken
plea situation. The court can permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea and plead anew or the court can grant specific performance of the
agreement. 6
Withdrawal of the plea is often ill-suited to provide the defendant,
who has entered a guilty plea in reliance on an unkept bargain, suffi-
cient relief. This remedy is designed to restore the defendant to the
status quo ante, but this aim is difficult to accomplish after a bargained
plea. The defendant has often given information 62 or provided the
prosecution with invaluable assistance. 63 It is difficult to effectively re-
store the defendant to the status existing before the bargain; thus, with-
drawal may provide an illusory promise to the defendant who has
entered a guilty plea in reliance upon the good faith of the prosecu-
64tion.
58. Green, Word & Arcuri, Plea Bargaining. Fairness and Inadequacy of Representation, 7
COLUM, HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 495 (1975).
59. 594 F.2d at 19 n.9.
60. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
61. Id. at 263.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 457 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant incriminated
himself and others in prosecution involving stolen Treasury checks); United States v. Paiva, 294 F.
Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) (defendant admitted that he forged and uttered stolen savings bonds).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) (defendant provided
handwriting exemplars).
64. Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining. Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 AMER.
CRIM. L. REV. 771, 793 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Remedies].
8
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Specific performance has been rarely utilized by the courts to pro-
vide a remedy in the unkept bargain situation. After Santobello, how-
ever, there is an increasing tendency among the courts to grant this
remedy when there are substantial factors calling for enforcement of
the bargain. This increase can be directly attributed to the Supreme
Court's recognition of specific performance as an appropriate remedy.
Although the majority in Santobello remanded the case and left the
remedy to be granted in the discretion of the trial court,65 Justice Doug-
las, concurring, urged that the trial court in adopting a remedy should
"accord a defendant's preference considerable, if not controlling,
weight .. ."66 Moreover, Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion
suggested that the remedy granted by the trial court should be limited
to that requested by the defendant.67
Specific performance is generally used to provide a remedy when the
defendant cannot be restored to the status quo ante. This remedy is
uniquely tailored to the exigencies of the unkept plea bargain. It is
more compatible with the parties' original expectations and shifts the
burden and loss resulting from the broken promise to the party who has
not acted in good faith.68
The court in Cooper directed specific performance of the proposal
because there were intervening causes that had so compromised the de-
fendant's position that withdrawal of the plea could not restore him to
the status quo ante. Moreover, the defendant had requested that the
Government be forced to fullfill its end of the bargain. In granting
specific performance the court accorded "considerable, if not control-
ling, weight" to the defendant's preference.
The decision in Cooper significantly expands the situations under
which relief may be granted for an unkept plea bargain by evincing a
willingness of the court to recognize that both analogies from contract
law and constitutional rights can be used to safeguard the defendant
from the possible abuses in the plea bargaining process.
The defendant who claims his guilty plea was the result of
prosecutorial promises that were not kept will be granted relief where
the agreement is within the mechanical contract law rules of offer and
acceptance. The analogies from contract law would be the appropriate
means for determining whether relief is in order when a firm offer has
been made by the prosecution and the defendant effectively communi-
cates his acceptance to the prosecution. If in this situation the prosecu-
tor fails to carry out the agreement, the defendant is clearly entitled to
65. 404 U.S.at 263.
66. Id. at 266.
67. Id. at 268.
68. Remedies, supra note 64, at 794.
9
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relief for this breach. Resort to principles of contract law can also be
had where the defendant pleads guilty after a promise by the prosecu-
tor that by its nature is unfulfillable and the defendant justifiably relies
to his detriment.69 The doctrine of promissory estoppel arises, the pros-
ecutor is estopped to deny the existence of the promise, and relief is
given to the defendant.
Although in most instances unkept plea bargains are readily reme-
died by resort to principles of contract law, the occasional situation
arises where there has been no formal offer and acceptance, or, if an
offer was made, it was withdrawn in an unreasonably short time. In the
former, no right arises in the defendant because there was no agree-
ment consumated, and in the latter, there is nothing giving rise to
promissory estoppel because the defendant suffered no tangible detri-
ment.
It is precisely toward these situations that the constitutional rule
adopted by the court in Cooper is directed. To allow the prosecution to
force the defendant's rights to liberty and fair treatment to turn on the
fortuities of communications is to disregard the fact that it is the de-
fendant's constitutional rights that are flouted by the prosecutor's fail-
ure to go forward. The defendant no longer has to show any tangible
detriment but merely that his justifiable expectations that the prosecu-
tion will honor its proposal were not met. A refusal to recognize that
the defendant in this situation is entitled to relief would be an abdica-
tion by the courts, of their duty to develop satisfactory standards for
regulating plea bargaining, and would necessarily give judicial ap-
proval to a practice where the possibilities of abuse are abundantly
clear.
Whatever might be the situation in the ideal world, the fact is that
the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important
components of this country's criminal justice system.7" It is incumbent
upon the judiciary to promulgate standards which will adequately safe-
guard the defendant's right to be treated fairly, as well as the public's
interest in effective and efficient administration of justice.
The court in Cooper recognized these sometimes competing interests
69. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976) (unfulfillable promises are
binding if fundamental fairness cannot be achieved without enforcing the agreement); United
States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant allowed to withdraw guilty plea
made in reliance on prosecutorial misrepresentations that trial court had agreed to sentence de-
fendant to probation rather than imprisonment); Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1975) (defendant, who pleaded guilty in reliance on prosecutorial promises which by their nature
were unfulfillable, granted specific performance of the agreement).
70. 434 U.S. at 361-62. "It follows that, by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of
pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the
prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead
not guilty." Id. at 364.
10
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and arrived at what must be viewed as a very beneficial compromise.
This was accomplished while recognizing on the one hand that the de-
fendant's rights may be violated before the formation of a bilateral con-
tract, and on the other hand that the public's concern for optimal
utilization of scarce judicial resources and its confidence that an ac-
cused will be afforded that to which he is reasonably entitled. The two-
tier approach adopted by the court, when properly employed, can read-
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